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ABSTRACT
Data as a commodity has always been purchased and sold.
Recently, web services that are data marketplaces have emerged
that match data buyers with data sellers. So far there are no
guidelines how to price queries against a database. We con-
sider the recently proposed query-based pricing framework
of Koutris et al. [13] and ask the question of computing op-
timal input prices in this framework by formulating a buyer
utility model.
We establish the interesting and deep equivalence between
arbitrage-freeness in the query-pricing framework and envy-
freeness in pricing theory for appropriately chosen buyer
valuations. Given the approximation hardness results from
envy-free pricing we then develop logarithmic approxima-
tion pricing algorithms exploiting the max flow interpreta-
tion of the arbitrage-free pricing for the restricted query lan-
guage proposed by [13]. We propose a novel polynomial-time
logarithmic approximation pricing scheme and show that
our new scheme performs better than the existing envy-free
pricing algorithms instance-by-instance. We also present a
faster pricing algorithm that is always greater than the ex-
isting solutions, but worse than our previous scheme. We ex-
perimentally show how our pricing algorithms perform with
respect to the existing envy-free pricing algorithms and to
the optimal exponentially computable solution, and our ex-
periments show that our approximation algorithms consis-
tently arrive at about 99% of the optimal.
Keywords
query-based pricing, optimal pricing, envy-freeness, arbitrage-
freeness
1. INTRODUCTION
Several online data marketplaces have emerged over the
past years. We as the database community have started to
lay the foundations of such data marketplaces and define and
understand models of their functionality [13, 16, 18]. The
goal of this new line of research has so far taken the form
of how to design automated algorithms for pricing query re-
quests to a database. Most of the current data marketplaces
work with ad-hoc rules, mainly offering a menu of queries
and prices to the users or offering subscription based services
for whole datasets. The sudden increase of the amount of
online data and the different needs of the potential buyers
will soon render such an approach infeasible or inefficient in
terms of both revenue and social welfare of the system.
However, most of previous work has taken the axiomatic
approach on pricing queries to a relational database [13, 16,
18]. They posed a set of reasonable axioms like arbitrage-
freeness, no-disclosive pricing, maximality of prices and then
characterized the pricing functions that adhere to these ax-
ioms, most of them showing uniqueness of prices.
However, none of the literature has given guidelines to the
foundational question: How should the market-maker actu-
ally price the fundamental queries of her database? Most
of the literature is focused on how to derive prices given
some fundamental input prices from the seller, e.g., prices
on basic queries or prices on cells of the database, but has
not addressed the question of how to compute these initial
prices in the first place!
In this work we resolve the above problem by using a game
theoretic approach to pricing relational queries building on
recent ideas from the optimal pricing literature [11, 2, 5].
Using such techniques we actually give an answer to the
question above: What should be the optimal revenue pric-
ing scheme for the seller. As a first major result, we show
that several of the axioms assumed in the recent database
literature are implications of the optimal pricing approach
thereby justifying them and at the same time laying theo-
retical foundations behind them.
Online data marketplaces, in addition to optimal, require
simple pricing schemes, with simple and intuitive rules. This
has been the motivating force behind the recent query-based
pricing framework [13], that provides a simple and easy-to-
compute pricing approach. In contrast, most of the opti-
mal mechanism design literature concludes that the optimal
mechanism that the seller should run involves very compli-
cated pricing rules. Our second major result in this paper
is to merge the two approaches of the database and the op-
timal mechanism design community in the following way:
We will restrict attention to the simple query-based pricing
schemes of [13], but we actually solve for the optimal pricing
among these schemes.
The main difference in our paper with previous work from
the database community is that we will also model the buyer
preferences using widely used utility theory models, i.e., we
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will assume that the users (players) have valuations over
data in the relational database.
Buyer Utility Model. We consider the following model:
There are n buyers and one seller possessing information in
the form of a relational database. Each buyer i is interested
in the result of a query qi to the database that is sold and has
a value vi for the results of this query. The query qi that
each buyer is interested in, falls into some set of queries
D predefined by the seller. We will assume that the pair
(vi, qi) of every buyer is known to the seller and hence, the
problem of maximizing revenue is an algorithmic question.
In practical applications one should think of the above set
of buyers as a representative demand that the seller has
calculated will arrive in his market. For instance, through
market analysis he might have concluded that out of a 100
buyers, x of them will have value v1 and will want query
q1, y will have value v2 and want query q2 and so on. We
simply explicitly represent this representative demand load
as a set of buyers.
Query Pricing Model. We restrict the pricing mechanism
of the seller according to the query-based pricing framework
of Koutris et al. [13]. Specifically, the seller sets explicitly
the price to a bundle of queries B, which are called the base
queries. From this set of queries, the price of every query
in the database is computed according to the Fundamental
Pricing Function introduced in [13].
We will assume that the set of base queries B and de-
manded queries D is such that the Fundamental Pricing
Function is polynomially computable. For instance, if the
set of bundles D that the buyers are interested in are Gen-
eralized Chain Queries, as described in [13] and the base-
queries are all the selection queries, then [13] shows that the
computation of the Fundamental Pricing Function can be
reduced to a max-flow computation.
When the seller chooses a set of base queries and their
prices, then the price p(qi) of each bundle is uniquely deter-
mined. A buyer will buy the bundle if and only if p(qi) ≤ vi.
Hence, given a choice of input prices for the base queries the
revenue of the seller is:
R =
∑
i∈[n]:vi≥p(qi)
p(qi) (1)
The above formulation allows us to ask the main question
of this work:
Main Question. Given a set of bidder valuations and de-
manded queries what is the choice of input prices on base-
queries that maximize the total revenue of the seller?
Our Results
We start by presenting a very strong connection between the
query-based pricing model and the envy-free optimal pric-
ing literature that has been recently developed by the algo-
rithmic game theory community. Specifically, we show that
the fundamental pricing formula of [13] is a consequence of
envy-freeness in envy-free pricing with appropriately defined
buyer valuations, which we call unit-bundle-demand valuations.
In addition, we show that the polynomial computation of the
pricing formula simply corresponds to saying that the de-
mand function (i.e. set that the player wants to buy given a
set of prices) in the envy-free pricing model is polynomially
computable, even when the valuation of the bidder is given
in the concise representation of a value vi and a query Qi.
We use this strong connection to show that the optimal
pricing question that we ask is NP-hard even in very natural
instances that might arise in practice. We then proceed
with presenting the logarithmic approximation, randomized
single price-scheme of Balcan et al. [2] in our setting. We
use the polynomial computability of the demand function to
obtain a deterministic single pricing scheme that obtains a
logarithmic approximation to the optimal pricing scheme.
Then we present novel multi-price pricing schemes that
built upon the intuition obtained by the single-price schemes.
We give two multi-price schemes that achieve revenue at
least as much as the single-price schemes pointwise, for each
instance of the problem. The hardness of the pricing prob-
lem is mainly due to the fact that we don’t know which
subset of the players are going to be allocated by the op-
timal pricing. Our algorithms are based upon strategically
picking a polynomial number of subsets of allocated players
and then solving for the optimal or approximately optimal
pricing, subject to each allocation set, outputting the set
that yielded the highest revenue. When solving for the op-
timal pricing conditional on the allocation set, we use the
polynomial computability of the demand function implied
by the max-flow reduction of [13] as a separation oracle.
In the last part we provide some experimental analysis
of how our new multi-price approximation schemes perform
with respect to the existing single-price schemes from the
envy-free pricing literature and show that they yield a sub-
stantial increase to the revenue produced, over random input
instances. In addition, for instances where the exponential
computation of the optimal pricing is feasible we show that
our approximation algorithms guarantee more than 99% of
the optimal.
Related Work
Axiomatic Pricing of Relational Data. Balazinska et
al. [1] motivated the need of new models for capturing
online market places. The stress the need for more fine-
grained pricing and try to motivate more automated pricing
systems than the existing ”price menu”-based ones. They
mention several modeling parameters that a pricing mar-
ket should define: 1) the structural granularity at which the
seller should attach prices (this could either be tuples or cells
of tables, queries, relations etc.) 2) a base pricing function
attaching seller defined prices at the chosen granularity 3) a
method for determining the price of every other allowable in-
teraction with the database (e.g. query price) from the base
pricing function, 4) a subscription model specifying how up-
dates to the data are priced. They also axiomatically define
some desiderata for pricing functions, like arbitrage-freeness,
fairness and efficiency.
Koutris et al. [12, 13] considered a query based model of
pricing. In their model, the structural granularity of pricing
is a query. The seller sets the price of a specific set of base
queries and then the automated algorithm has to derive the
price of any other query that could be made to the database.
They show that given a base pricing function there exists a
unique maximal arbitrage-free pricing function and give a
fundamental formula that defines it. They show that com-
puting the price of a query based on this function is NP-
hard for the case when base queries are general conjunctive
queries. Their main result is a polynomial time algorithm,
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via a reduction to max-flow, for computing the price of any
Generalized Chain Query (a special type of join conjunctive
query) when the base queries are only selection queries. The
arbitrage property studied by [13] is based on an instance
based determinacy relationship: if for the current instance
of the database, one could determine the result of a query Q
be the result of a bundle of queries Q1, . . . , Qk then it must
be that p(Q) ≤
∑k
i=1 p(Qi). In addition, in a follow-up pa-
per [14] they provide a description of an implementation of
their framework as a working marketplace.
Li et al. [16] studied the pricing of aggregate queries and
more specifically the pricing of the special type of linear
queries (i.e. aggregate queries that can be expressed as a
linear combination of the column entries of a relationship).
They also follow a similar approach to [13] in that the seller
prices a base set of linear queries and then the market al-
gorithm computes the price of the remaining queries such
that it satisfies arbitrage freeness. There are several crucial
differences with the approach of [13]. First, the arbitrage
freeness is based not on an instance based determinacy re-
lationship but rather on a schema based one: if for any in-
stance of the database, one could determine a linear query
Q using the answer to a bundle of linear queries Q1, . . . , Qk
then it must be that p(Q) ≤
∑k
i=1 p(Qi). This crucial differ-
ence makes the price function independent of the instance
of the database. This is a crucial property that Li et al.
actually require as an axiom; if the price function were de-
pendent on the instance then just asking for a price quote for
a specific query could potentially reveal information about
the database entries. The latter could potentially lead to
manipulation by the buyers. This is the property of non-
disclosive pricing introduced in Liu et al.. It is interesting
to observe that the pricing function of Koutris et al. doesn’t
satisfy this property and hence is potentially susceptible to
such manipulations.
Tang et al. [18] take a different approach than the previ-
ous two papers and consider tuples of relations as the struc-
tural granularity of the pricing function. Hence, the seller
now places prices on tuples of the database and then the
price of a query is a function of the tuples that contribute
to the response of the query. They also construct pricing
functions that are arbitrage free. In addition they also ap-
ply their pricing model to probabilistic databases.
Last, a very recent working paper [15] tries to address
the question of query pricing in combination with differen-
tial privacy. However, we don’t plan to address differential
privacy issues in this project hence we just refer to it for
completeness purposes.
Optimal Mechanism Design. If we think of each query
as an item then our setting could be cast as a combinatorial
auction with single-minded bidders, where each query is an
item and each bidder is interested in a specific bundle of
items/queries and has a value vi for acquiring that bundle.
In the Bayesian setting the type of each player is his bun-
dle of interest and his value. Under such a formulation our
question becomes the classical question of optimal pricing in
a multidimensional setting. When there are constraints on
the allocation of queries to buyers (i.e. if a serve this query
to this buyer then I cannot serve this other query to some
other buyer) then the problem becomes the classical prob-
lem of mutli-dimensional optimal mechanism design. Both
problems have daunted the theoretical economics commu-
nity for several decades since the seminal work of Myerson
[17] on the single-dimensional version of the problem, with
only partial progress. Very recently the algorithmic game
theory community has given algorithmic solutions to these
problems. Specifically, Cai and Daskalakis [5] solves the
multi-dimensional pricing problem, under conditions of the
distribution of types. Cai, Daskalakis and Weinberg [6, 7]
solve the multi-dimensional mechanism design setting under
very general feasibility constraint and in running time poly-
nomial in the size of the type spaces. Recently, Daskalakis,
Deckelbaum and Tzamos [9] show hardness results when the
description of the type distributions is given in a concise
form and not explicitly. Another recent work by Bhalgat et
al [3], gives a much simpler solution to the optimal mecha-
nism design problem using a multiplicative weight updates
approach.
Envy-Free Item Pricing. Our formulation of the prob-
lem however is significantly different from the above. We
don’t consider the whole space of pricing schemes but only
a specific simple pricing scheme and optimize only over that.
The reason being that most of the above techniques tend to
give very complicated pricing rules and also rules.
Our formulation falls into the recent literature on envy-
free pricing with unlimited supply, starting by Guruswami
et al. [11]. In envy-free pricing a seller faces a set of n
buyers. Each buyer has a valuation vi(S) for each set S
of items. The seller is restricted to assigning prices to the
items. Given some item prices each buyer will pick the set
that yields him the highest utility: vi(S) −
∑
j∈S pj . The
literature then asks the question of how should the seller
price the items to maximize or approximately maximize his
revenue.
Guruswami et al [11] initiate the complexity study of this
problem. They study the case where bidders are either unit-
demand or single-minded (i.e. want a specific set at some
value vi). They show that in both cases the problem is
NP-hard and in the second it is even hard to approximate,
and give a log(n)+ log(m) approximation scheme for single-
minded bidders that is based on posting the same price on
all items. Balcan et al. [2] extend the latter approximation
scheme to any combinatorial valuation using a randomized
single price scheme. We derandomize the pricing scheme of
Balcan et al. [2] for the specific valuation classes that arise
when buyers demand chain queries and the seller prices se-
lection queries, to obtain a deterministic single price scheme
for such valuations that are a generalization of single-minded
bidders. On the hardness side, Demaine et al. [10] showed
that under a mild complexity assumption no sublogarith-
mic (O(logǫ n)) polynomial approximation algorithm exists,
hence rendering the latter approximation algorithms almost
tight. Several other works have considered special instances
of the envy-free pricing framework both form approximation
and complexity perspective [8, 4].
2. QUERY PRICING MODEL
In this section we describe in more detail the practical
query-based pricing model of Koutris et al. [13]. In the next
section we will formulate our optimal pricing question under
this model and discuss it’s relation to the optimal item-
pricing problem with single-minded bidders initially studied
in [11].
Consider a seller that possesses an instanceD of a database
under some relational schema R = (R1, . . . ,Rk) and let Q
be the set of all queries to the database. For each relation
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R, denote with R.X an attribute X of that relation. The
seller selects a set of base queries B and explicitly assigns a
price pb for any base query b ∈ B and we denote with pB the
vector of input prices. Each potential buyer i is interested
in the results to a query qi on the database. The seller re-
stricts this query to fall into some predefined set of demand
queries D. Given the set of explicitly priced queries, a price
function p(q) defines the price of any possible query to the
database q ∈ Q.
The pricing function cannot be arbitrary but rather has
to satisfy some natural axioms. Koutris et al. [13] define a
minimal set of two axioms: arbitrage-freeness and discount-
freeness, which we briefly describe below.
The notion of arbitrage-freeness states that if query q can
be “determined” by queries q1, . . . , qk then it must be that
p(q) ≤
∑k
i=1 p(qi). Observe that the latter definition heav-
ily depends on the notion of determinacy used (see [13] for
a detailed exposition of the properties and the different no-
tions of determinacy). We will assume here some abstract
notion of determinacy and will denote with D ⊢ ∪ki=1qi ։ q,
if queries q1, . . . , qk determine q in the database instance D.
A price function p(q) is valid if it is arbitrage-free and the
price of explicitly priced queries is equal to the input price:
∀b ∈ B : p(b) = pb.
A pricing function is discount-free if for any other valid
pricing function pˆ(q) it holds: ∀q ∈ Q : pˆ(q) ≤ p(q), i.e.
no other valid pricing function assigns a higher price to any
query in the database.
Koutris et al. [13] show that, given set of base queries
and input prices, there is a unique pricing function that
satisfies the axioms of arbitrage-freeness and discount free-
ness. Specifically, they characterize this pricing function as
follows:
Theorem 1 (Fundamental Pricing Function [13]) Let
B be a set of base queries and (pb)b∈B be the input prices.
For any query q ∈ Q, let
suppBD(q) = {C ⊆ B | D ⊢ ∪bi∈Cbi ։ q} (2)
be the set of support sets of query q, i.e. a set of base queries
C ∈ suppBD(q) if they determine q. There is a unique pricing
function that satisfies the axioms of arbitrage-freeness and
discount-freeness and is defined as:
p(q) = min
C∈suppB
D
(q)
∑
b∈C
pb (3)
The description of the function is pretty natural: consider all
possible sets of queries among the explicitly priced queries,
that determine query q. Then the price of query q is the
price of the cheapest such set.
Polynomial Computability of Price Function. Koutris et
al [13] show that computing the price function is an NP-hard
problem in general and characterize under which assumption
on the determinacy relation, on the set of base queries B and
on the set of demand queries D the function is polynomially
computable.
Polynomial Oracle Assumption. In this work we will
assume that the sets B and D, as well as the determinacy re-
lation are such that there exists a polynomial time algorithm
AB,pBD (q) that computes the minimizer in the Fundamental
Pricing formula (3):
AB,pBD (q) = arg min
C∈suppB
D
(q)
∑
b∈C
pb (4)
Our approximation algorithms will use oracle access to this
algorithm. Specifically, our main algorithm will use it as a
separation oracle to solve in polynomial time a linear pro-
gram with exponentially many constraints.
The oracle assumption that we make is not a vacuous one
and in fact Koutris et al. [13] show that for a very natu-
ral class of base and demand queries the above minimizer
can be computed via a reduction to a min-cut computation
in a query specific graph. More specifically, reinterpreting
the results of [13], suppose that the notion of instance-based
determinacy is used, the class of base queries is the set of
all selection queries to the database and the class of de-
mand queries is a subset of conjunctive queries, called chain
queries. Then for every query q ∈ D one can construct a
weighted graph with two special vertices s and t in polyno-
mial time, such that all the edges with finite weight corre-
spond to base queries and have weight equal to their price
and all other constructed edges have infinite weight and such
that all finite weight s-t cuts of the graph correspond to sets
C ∈ suppBD(q). We defer a more detailed exposition of the
above class of queries for the experimental section where we
present experimental results for a simplified version of the
above class of queries.
3. ENVY-FREE ITEM PRICING
In this section we re-interpret the analysis of query-pricing
and cast it as an envy-free item pricing problem with unlim-
ited supply of items [11]. This re-interpretation will allow us
to use techniques and results from envy-free pricing as well
as make the exposition much cleaner. In additional it will
allow us to formulate the question of maximizing revenue in
query-based pricing.
In the setting of envy-free item-pricing, the seller possesses
a set of items J each one in infinite supply. Each of the n
buyers has some combinatorial valuations vi(S) for getting a
set of items S ⊆ J . If a buyer gets a set of items S ⊆ J and
pays pj for each item j ∈ S then his utility is quasi-linear:
ui(S,pS) = vi(S)−
∑
j∈S
pj (5)
A vector of prices pJ = (pj)j∈J on the items and an al-
location Si for bidder i is envy-free if no can increase his
utility by selecting some other set at the given prices, i.e.
he doesn’t envy some other allocation. In other words the
set Si has to satisfy:
Si = argmax
S⊆I
ui(S,pS) = argmax
S⊆I
vi(S)−
∑
j∈S
pj (6)
Given a vector of prices pJ and allocations (Si)i∈[n] the rev-
enue of the seller is:
∑
i∈[n]
∑
j∈Si
pj .
The envy-free pricing literature asks the question of com-
puting the optimal pair of prices and allocations such that
the total revenue is maximized, subject to the constraint
that allocations should be envy-free.
In the next section we show that if we pick an appropriate
natural definition of bidder valuations then the envy-free
optimal pricing question becomes equivalent to our initial
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question of computing optimal input prices for base queries
in the arbitrage-free pricing framework.
3.1 Equivalence to Arbitrage-Free Pricing
To even be able to formulate the question of optimal query
pricing in the arbitrage free framework we need to introduce
a buyer valuation model. Our valuation stems from the
following natural assumption: we assume that each buyer
has a value vi ∈ [0, H ] (where H is some upper bound on
the valuation) for getting the results to his demand query
qi. Hence, a player gets a value vi if he gets the responses
to query qi or to any other set of queries q1, . . . , qk that
determine qi. Then our main question asks, how should the
seller price his base queries such that he maximizes his total
revenue, assuming that each buyer pays the price implied by
the Fundamental Pricing Function for his demanded query
(as long as this price is below vi).
For any such instance of the optimal query-pricing frame-
work we present a corresponding instance of the envy-free
pricing framework that renders the above question equiva-
lent to the optimal envy-free pricing question. We will inter-
pret each of the queries B that the seller prices explicitly as
items of unlimited supply in the envy-free pricing instance.
Each bidder i has a valuation vi(S) for getting a set of
items S defined as follows: he gets a value vi ∈ [0, H ] if he
gets the set of items corresponding to any set C ∈ suppBD(qi)
or a superset of such a set and 0 otherwise. More formally,
the valuation of buyer i for buying a set of items S ss:
vi(S) =
{
vi if S ⊇ C ∈ supp
B
D(qi)
0 o.w
(7)
We will refer to such valuations as unit-bundle-demand val-
uations.
The seller simply sets prices on the items. Observe that
for such valuations, given any vector of item prices, an al-
location is envy-free only if each buyer is getting the set
Ci ∈ supp
B
D(qi) that gives him his value vi at the lowest
price:
∀C′ ∈ suppBD(qi) :
∑
j∈Ci
pj ≤
∑
j∈C′
pj (8)
Hence, given a set of item prices or equivalently base query
prices, a buyer interested in a query qi will pay:
min
C∈suppB
D
(qi)
∑
j∈C
pj , (9)
subject to the latter quantity being lower than his value.
The latter is exactly the price given by the Fundamental
Pricing Formula (3) for query qi.
Thus maximizing revenue in the query-pricing model trans-
lates to finding the optimal envy-free pricing in an instance
where bidders have unit-bundle-demand valuations.
The other interesting aspect of the problem is that the val-
uations of the bidders is given implicitly by the pair (vi, qi).
Hence, our algorithms should perform in polynomial time
with respect to this succinct representation of the input.
The suncinctness of the representation makes it potentially
hard to compute the envy-free allocation. In essence, given
the item prices we don’t know which set the player is going
to choose, and hence we cannot even compute the revenue
of some instantiation of the item prices. However, observe
that computing the envy-free allocation of a bidder is equiva-
lent to computing the minimizer in the Fundamental Pricing
Formula. Thus this corresponds exactly to the polynomial
computability of the Fundamental Pricing Formula. There-
fore, for instances where our polynomial oracle assumption
holds we can use the oracle AB,pBD (q) (e.g. min-cut for chain
queries) to compute the envy-free allocation of a bidder,
even under such succinct representation of the valuation.
In subsequent sections we will use this property of the
valuation functions so as to derandomize randomized pricing
schemes proposed in the literature and as a separation oracle
in an improved pricing algorithm that we propose.
Hardness of Optimal Pricing. Even in the case when
computing the envy-free allocation is polynomially computable,
the problem of finding optimal envy-free prices has been
shown to be NP-hard and even hard to approximate [11].
For instance, the problem is NP-hard even when each buyer
is interested only in a specific single set (i.e. suppBD(qi) is
a singleton set) and has a value vi for acquiring it (single-
minded bidders). In the appendix we give an alternative
NP-hardness reduction that shows that the problem is hard
even for instances that naturally arise from database query
instances, when each relation has a single attribute and the
queries of the bidders are either selections or a join the in-
volves all relations.
4. APPROXIMATELY OPTIMAL PRICING
Given the hardness results in the literature mentioned in
the previous section, in this section we address the problem
of finding approximately optimal pricing schemes. We start
by a simple random pricing scheme proposed by Balcan et al.
[2] that assigns the same price on all base queries and that
yields an O(log(n) + log(m)) approximation to the optimal
revenue where n is the number of buyers and m is the num-
ber of items or equivalently, explicitly priced base queries
(i.e. for instance all selection queries of the database). Then
we show how to derandomize this pricing scheme to obtain
more robust guarantees, by using the polynomial oracle as-
sumption.
4.1 Random Price
Balcan et al. [2] show that in the envy-free pricing model,
for arbitrary valuation functions, as long as the value of the
bidders are bounded by some constant H , then a simple ran-
domized single-pricing scheme achieves a O(log(n)+log(m))
approximation to the optimal pricing scheme. We present
this scheme in the context of query-based pricing.
ALGORITHM 1: Randomized Single Price Scheme.
Input : H = maxi vi
1 Let ql =
H
2l−1
, for l ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊log(2nm)⌋};
2 Pick a random price p uniformly at random from the set
{q1, . . . , qs};
3 Price all base queries in B at price p.
Although the above price gives a nice worse case approxi-
mation guarantee, it only achieves it in expectation. In the
next section we show how to derandomize the above scheme
to obtain a deterministic single-price scheme that achieves
the same guarantee deterministically.
4.2 Derandomizing Using Polynomial Oracle
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The analysis in this section is a generalization of the anal-
ysis in Guruswami et al. [11] that provide a similar deter-
ministic single pricing scheme, only for the case of single
minded bidders and not for the more general unit-bundle-
demand valuations that we need to cope with.
Our analysis starts with the following observation: if the
price of all base queries is the same then the minimizer of
the Fundamental Pricing Formula does not depend on the
actual price. Rather it is simply going to be the support set
Ci ∈ supp
B
D(qi) of minimum size. Let ti = |Ci| be the size
of that set. Given the demanded query qi of each buyer,
the size of his minimum set and the minimum set itself is
polynomially computable byAB,pBD (qi). Simply place a price
of 1 on all base queries and invoke the oracle.
Given the value vi and the size ti of his smallest support
set, we assign the same price to all base queries according
to Algorithm 2. We prove that this deterministic algorithm
gives a log(n) + log(m) approximation guarantee.
ALGORITHM 2: Deterministic Single Price Scheme.
Input : (v1, t1), . . . , (vn, tn)
1 Let pii =
vi
ti
be the per-base-query value of each buyer ;
2 Reorder players such that pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ . . . ≥ pin;
3 For i = {1, . . . , n} let Ri be the revenue obtained by
pricing all base queries at pii. ;
4 Ri is polynomially computable since ti is and is simply
pii
∑
i′≤i ti′ ;
5 Let i∗ = argmaxiRi. Price each selection query at pii∗
Theorem 2 Algorithm 2 computes a pricing that is O(log(n)+
log(m))-approximately optimal.
Proof. If all items are charged at πi thenRi = πi
∑
i′≤i ti′ .
Since the revenue R of the algorithm is at least Ri for all i
we get: R ≥ vi
ti
∑
i′≤i ti′ . Hence,
vi ≤ R
ti∑
i′≤i ti′
(10)
Summing over all players we get:
∑
i
vi ≤ R
∑
i
ti∑
i′≤i ti′
= R
∑
i
ti∑
k=1
1∑
i′≤i ti′
≤ R
∑
i
ti∑
k=1
1
k +
∑
i′<i
ti′
= R
∑
i
ti∑
k=1
1
k
≤ R
n·m∑
k=1
1
k
= R ·Hn·m ≤ R log(n ·m)
Now the theorem follows by simply observing that the rev-
enue of the optimal pricing scheme is at most
∑
i
vi since
we can extract a revenue of at most vi from each bidder.
In fact the above theorem shows that this pricing scheme
achieves at least a log(n ·m) bound with respect to the total
value of the bidders, which is a stronger benchmark than
the optimal revenue. In fact, the following easy example
shows that even when there is only a single base query to
be priced no query-pricing scheme (even ignoring computa-
tional constraints) can achieve a revenue better than log(n)
of the total value of the buyers.
Example. Consider a set of n buyers and a database with
only a single priced base query. Suppose that the value of
buyer i is 1/i. Hence, the total value of the buyers is Hn.
On the other hand it is easy to see that any base query price
will yield a revenue of at most 1. Observe that an optimal
price will be of the form 1/k for some k ∈ [1, n]. However, if
we post a price of 1/k then we know that only k buyers have
a valuation higher than 1/k and therefore only k buyers will
ever buy. Hence, the total revenue will be 1.
Last, it is interesting to note that the above pricing scheme
is a very easy to implement and announce for large web
applications. The seller simply needs to announce a single
price to the potential buyers and then each buyers price will
depend on the information size of his query as is implied
by the number of base queries needed to determine it. The
latter is also an easy to describe explanation to the buyer
for the price he had to pay for his query.
5. IMPROVED MULTI-PRICE SCHEMES
The pricing schemes in the previous section though ap-
proximately optimal in the worse case, they take minimal
advantage of the structure of the valuations of the bidders.
It is obvious that an optimal pricing scheme would take ad-
vantage of the specific structure of the bidder valuations and
the demanded queries to assign different prices to different
selection queries.
In this section we present an algorithm that although
asymptotically has the same worse case guarantees, never-
theless performs strictly better than the single price schemes
of the previous section point-wise, for each instance of the
pricing problem.
We first point out that when the base query prices are not
the same then the minimizer of the Fundamental Pricing
Formula for any query depends heavily on the actual prices
and hence we cannot abstract by saying that it is always
going to be the support set with the smallest size.
Hence, the base query set that determines the price of a
buyers query is affected by the input prices and the revenue
is subsequently affected by this set. This creates a feedback
problem that would lead to an exponential algorithm if we
were to proceed in optimizing over the space of all possible
input prices.
In addition, it is not clear which of the buyers the optimal
pricing scheme serves. In fact the NP-hardness of the prob-
lem stems mainly from this fact. We portray this in the next
section by first considering the case of single-minded bid-
ders. We propose an improved algorithm for single-minded
bidders and then we generalize it to the general class of val-
uations that we cope with.
5.1 Single-Minded Valuations
In order to develop some intuition, in this section we con-
sider the special case where the support set suppBD(qi) of
each buyer is a singleton. Thus each buyer is satisfied only
by a specific set of base queries Ci.
We start by observing that if we knew that the optimal
pricing scheme was serving a set N∗ of bidders then com-
puting the optimal prices can be done in polynomial time.
Specifically, conditional on the service set N∗ the optimal
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pricing scheme can be written as a packing LP:
R(N∗) = max
pB
∑
i∈N∗
∑
b∈Ci
pb
s.t.
∑
b∈Ci
pb ≤ vi ∀i ∈ N
∗ (11)
pb ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B
Thus a trivial exponential algorithm would be to enumer-
ate over all 2n possible service sets, compute the revenue of
the optimal pricing and then pick the service set that yields
the highest revenue. This is too costly and our approach
is to identify a polynomial number of candidate service sets
to check which will guarantee that an approximately good
pricing scheme would be found in some of this polynomially
sized search space.
The single-price schemes in the previous section and their
analysis, gives us exactly that. Essentially they show that
in order to find a pricing scheme that is a logarithmic ap-
proximation to the optimal pricing, one needs to consider
only n possible service sets: the sets of the form {1, . . . , i}
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where players are ordered with decreasing
per-item value πi =
vi
|Ci|
.
This yields the following pricing scheme for single-minded
bidders.
ALGORITHM 3: Multi-Price Scheme for Single-
Minded Bidders.
Input : (v1, C1), . . . , (vn, Cn)
1 Let pii =
vi
|Ci|
be the per-base-query value of each bidder.
;
2 Reorder players such that pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ . . . ≥ pin;
3 For i = {1, . . . , n} let Ni = {1, . . . , i};
4 Compute Ri = R(Ni) obtained by LP (11);
5 Let i∗ = argmaxiRi. Output the pricing obtained by
solving LP R(Ni∗ ).
Theorem 3 Algorithm 2 is O(log(n)+log(m))-approximately
optimal and is at least as good as Algorithm 2 for any in-
stance of the pricing problem.
In addition it is easy to see with the following example
that the multi-pricing scheme presented above can actu-
ally achieve revenue Hm times larger than the single-price
scheme of the previous section, where m is the number of
base queries.
Example. Consider a setting with m buyers and m se-
lection queries. Each buyer is single-minded and buyer i
wants only query i, while having value vi = 1/i for it. Any
optimal single price scheme will post some price p = 1/k on
all the items for some k. Any such single price will obtain
a revenue of 1 since only k buyers will actually buy. On
the other hand the multi-price algorithm will actually price
item i with pi = 1/i and achieve the whole value of Hm as
revenue.
5.2 Unit-Bundle-Demand Valuations
In this section we extend Algorithm 2 to the general class
of unit-bundle-demand valuations that we cope with. For
more general valuations, a bidder could be satisfied by more
than one set of base queries. Hence, we also need to take care
of arbitrage opportunities that the bidder might have and
augment the LP of the previous section with no-arbitrage or
equivalently envy-free constraints.
However, we also don’t know the base set that is the min-
imizer of the fundamental pricing formula for each player,
since that set depends on the actual prices. Handling the
multiplicity of the interest sets would lead to a non linear
constraint if we were to directly adapt the LP in the previous
section.
Hence, we need in some sense we need to fix the minimizer
of the fundamental pricing formula for each player before
optimizing over the revenue, i.e. we have to predetermine
from which of his multiple sets the player is going to be
satisfied by. Then we will formulate an LP that captures
the fact that the player should not be envying being satisfied
by any other of the sets in his support at the current price
levels.
We will again use the intuition behind the single pricing
schemes to determine the latter pre-determined set. Specifi-
cally, we will fix that each bidder will pick the set of queries
from his support set of minimum size. Observe that this was
the set that he picked when we were setting the same price
for all the items. Hence, it suffices to restrict ourselves to
such a constraint, so as to get a logarithmic approximation.
For every player i let Ci be his support set of minimum
size. Given a set of players N∗ that have to be served and
under the constraint that the minimizer of the fundamental
pricing formula has to be Ci for each player i, the optimal
revenue can be solved by the following LP:
R(N∗) = max
pB
∑
i∈N∗
∑
b∈Ci
pb
s.t.
∑
b∈Ci
pb ≤ vi ∀i ∈ N
∗
(12)∑
b∈Ci
pb ≤
∑
b∈C′
i
pb ∀i ∈ N
∗, C′i ∈ supp
B
D(qi)
pb ≥ 0 ∀b ∈ B
The third set of constraints captures exactly the arbitrage-
freeness or equivalently the envy-freeness for each player i.
At first glance, the latter LP might be feasible, and specifi-
cally there is no guarantee that it will have a feasible solution
if we fix some arbitrary predefined sets, to be the minimiz-
ers of the pricing formulas. However, observe that for the
specific choice of predetermined sets that we did, the LP is
always feasible for any Ni = {1, . . . , i} (assuming players are
in decreasing πi order), since setting the price of every base
query to πi =
vi
|Ci|
is a feasible solution.
The latter also implies that the value R(Ni) of the above
LP is at least the revenue of the single pricing scheme in the
previous section for each Ni. Therefore, if we consider all
the serving sets of the form Ni and then take the serving set
that gave the maximum revenue, then we will get at least as
much revenue as the single pricing schemes of the previous
section.
The main problem with LP (12) is that the set suppBD(qi)
could potentially contain exponentially many elements. Hence,
the above LP can have exponentially many constraints.
However, the polynomial oracle assumption provides a
separation oracle for the above LP and hence it can be solved
in polynomial time using the ellipsoid method. Specifically,
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given a set of prices pB, we can check whether the exponen-
tially many constraints
∑
b∈Ci
pb ≤
∑
b∈C′
i
pb are violated,
by calling oracle AB,pBD (qi) with input prices pB (e.g. this
would correspond to a call to the min-cut computation de-
scribed in [13] for the case of chain queries). If the result of
AB,pBD (qi) is below
∑
b∈Ci
pb, then some of the constraints
is violated. More specifically it is the constraint that cor-
responds to the set C′i returned by the oracle as the actual
minimizer for the given prices. Hence, running AB,pBD (qi)
for each i ∈ [n] serves as a polynomial separation oracle for
LP (12).
5.3 A Simpler Faster Multi-Price Scheme
The pricing scheme described in the previous section in-
volves solving n linear programs. The computational over-
head of this addition could be substantial. Hence, it would
be interesting to consider more combinatorial pricing al-
gorithms that still are improvements to the single pricing
scheme.
In this section we propose such a pricing algorithm, which
is an alternative to solving LP (12) for each of the n serving
sets considered. The algorithm that we propose is described
in Figure 4.
ALGORITHM 4: Simpler Multi-Price Scheme for Gen-
eral Chain Query Demands.
Input : (v1, Q1), . . . , (vn, Qn)
1 Compute minimum size support set Ci for each buyer, by
running the corresponding oracle with input prices
initialized to 1.;
2 Let pii =
vi
|Ci|
be the per-base-query value of each buyer. ;
3 Reorder players such that pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ . . . ≥ pin;
4 For i = {1, . . . , n} let Ni = {1, . . . , i} and compute
Ri = R(Ni, (v1, C1), . . . , (vn, Cn)) using Procedure 5;
5 Let i∗ = argmaxiRi. Output the pricing obtained for
service set Ni∗ .
PROCEDURE 5: Procedure for finding prices condi-
tional on a service set Ni.
Input : (v1, C1), . . . , (vn, Cn) and service set Ni.
1 Initialize: S0 = B, N0 = Ni and (v0i , C
0
i ) = (vi, Ci),
∀b ∈ B : pb =∞;
while St = ∪i∈NtCi 6= ∅ do
2 Let pt = mini∈Nt
vt
i
|Ct
i
|
and it = argmini∈Nt
vt
i
|Ct
i
|
.;
3 Set pb = p
t for all base queries b ∈ Cit .;
4 Set Ct+1i = C
t
i − C
t
it
and vt+1i = v
t
i − |C
t
i ∩ C
t
it
| · p for
all i ∈ Nt.;
5 Nt+1 = Nt − {it}
Output: Return revenue produced by prices pB.
Algorithm 4 replaces the computationally costly LP with
a simpler algorithm that is not as optimal as solving the LP,
but still always performs at least as good as the single pric-
ing scheme. In fact our experimental analysis shows that it
performs almost as good as the LP algorithm of the previous
section.
The alternative process described above can be easily sum-
marized as follows: at each iteration pick the player that
has the smallest per-base-query valuation πi for the items
that haven’t already been priced. Then assign this per-base-
query valuation as a price on all the currently unpriced base
queries in the minimum size support set Ci of this player.
Then update the values of the players for the unpriced base
queries and update their minimum size support sets to be
the unpriced base queries of their initial set.
In the next theorem we formally show that the above pro-
cess always produces a revenue at least as high as the single
price revenue for any instance of the problem. Observe that
under the prices set by the latter algorithm it is not nec-
essarily true that the minimizer of the fundamental pricing
formula is Ci. However, despite this fact we still show that
the revenue is always at least as good as the single price rev-
enue. We show that by showing that the revenue is always
greater conditional on any service set Ni = {1, . . . , i}.
Theorem 4 For any Ni = {1, . . . , i}, Procedure 5 produces
revenue at least as much as posting a single price of πi =
vi
|Ci|
= mink∈Ni
vk
|Ck|
.
Proof. We show that the prices pB output by Procedure
5 are greater than or equal to πi. Given the above observe
that the total revenue must be greater since: the same set
of bidders Ni are allocated by the single pricing scheme and
by procedure 5 and the minimizer of the pricing formula
for each buyer contains at least as many base queries as
that of the minimum cardinality set Ci. Observe that in
the pricing output by procedure 5 it is not necessarily true
that under such pricing the minimizer is going to be the
minimum cardinality set, since prices are not the same for
all items. Hence, a player’s minimizing set might be some
other support set that has a larger size, but is priced cheaper.
However, our reasoning above still works, to produce revenue
at least as much.
To show our initial and main claim, we first show that the
per-base-query valuations of the players are monotonically
increasing as a function of the step t,(assume that if a player
is selected at some point in the process then after that his
per-item value is infinity). We show this by induction. More,
formally, let πtk =
vt
k
|Ct
k
|
be the per-base-query valuation of
player k ∈ Ni at step t. We will show that π
t
k ≥ π
t+1
k .
By the way the algorithm works, we know that for any
buyer: πti ≥ π
t
it = p
t. Hence:
πt+1k =
vtk − p
t|Ctk ∩ C
t
it |
|Ctk| − |C
t
k ∩ C
t
it
|
≥
vtk − π
t
k|C
t
k ∩ C
t
it |
|Ctk| − |C
t
k ∩ C
t
it
|
=
vtk −
vt
k
|Ct
k
|
|Ctk ∩ C
t
it |
|Ctk| − |C
t
k ∩ C
t
it
|
=
vtk
|Ctk|
|Ctk| − |C
t
k ∩ C
t
it |
|Ctk| − |C
t
k ∩ C
t
it
|
= πtk
Now observe that by the assumption on the ordering of
the players we have: πk ≥ πi for all k ∈ Ni = {1, . . . , i}.
Thus by the monotonicity of per-base-query valuations we
get that πtk ≥ πi for any player k and any step t. Consider
a base query b ∈ B. Suppose that query b was priced at
iteration t (if a query was never priced it means that it is
not in the set Ci of any buyer and hence we can ignore it
since it remains priced at a huge value H). Then we get:
pb = p
t = πtit ≥ πi.
6. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In the previous section we presented new pricing algo-
rithms that pointwise improve the existing approximation
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algorithms in the envy-free pricing literature, for the spe-
cific class of unit-bundle-demand valuations that arise from
the query-pricing framework. However, our algorithms don’t
improve the asymptotic efficiency which theoretically still
remains O(log(m) + log(n)).
In order to justify the usability of these new algorithms
we perform an experimental evaluation of their performance
when compared to the existing single-pricing schemes. In
addition, we also compare them with respect to the expo-
nential optimal algorithm for small instances, showing that
it achieves an almost optimal performance.
We first present our experimental results for the general
class of unit-bundle-demand valuations that arise when the
base queries are all the selection queries in the database
and the demand queries are the set of chain join queries
described by Koutris et al. [13]. For this general class of
complex valuations we compare the efficiency of our fast
multi-price scheme with respect to the single price one.
Subsequently, we focus on the simpler class of single-minded
valuations, so as to portray how our algorithms perform with
respect to the optimal pricing.
6.1 Chain Query Valuations
For this experimental evaluation we considered the in-
stantiation of the query-pricing framework where the no-
tion of instance based determinacy is used. The reader
is redirect to [13] for more detailed exposition. In the in-
stance, based determinacy framework each attribute is as-
sumed to take values from some predefined discrete set.
Specifically, for each attribute R.X of relation R, we denote
with ColR.X = {a1, . . . , at} a finite set of possible values
that attribute R.X has to lie in. Thus the database has
only a finite set of possible instances. Instance-based de-
terminacy states that a set of queries q1, . . . , qk determine
a query q under instance D, if for any other possible in-
stance D′, if the results of queries q1, . . . , qk remain exactly
the same as in D then it must be that the result of q also
remains the same.
Denote with σR.X=ai the selection query that corresponds
to selecting all entries of relation R that have value ai at at-
tributeR.X. In addition denote with ΣR.X = {σR.X=ai | ai ∈
ColR.X} to be the set of a selection queries for a particular
attribute of relation R, and denote with Σ the set of all se-
lections for all relations and all attributes. We consider the
setting where the set of base queries B is equal to the set of
all selection queries Σ.
For simplicity of exposition we consider only relational
schemas where each relation is a binary relation and each
buyer is interested in a Chain Query as is described in [13]:
Definition 5 A chain query is of the form of a join of k
relations: q = R1, . . . , Rk, where each Ri is a binary rela-
tion and each relation shares exactly one variable with each
successor.
The latter setting is a special case of the Generalized Chain
Queries of [13], hence for the latter setting we know by [13]
that the Fundamental Pricing Formula is polynomially com-
putable and is reduced to a min-cut computation.
We implemented Algorithm 4 instantiated for the latter
setting and compared each revenue performance with re-
spect to the single-price scheme, for varying parameters of
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Figure 1: This plot portrays the average ratio of
the revenue obtained by the LP based multi-price
scheme of Section 5.1 over the single-price revenue.
The number of buyers is constant 20 while the num-
ber of binary relations in the database varies from 5
to 325. The results imply that the ratio between the
two algorithms might be increasing logarithmically
in the number of binary relations for such random
instances.
the size of the schema, the number of possible values of each
attribute and the number of buyers. We observed that the
revenue ratio increases significantly as a function of the num-
ber of binary relations on the attributes in the schema. Our
instances where produced by sampling random chain queries
on given relational schemas of varying size. The number of
possible values of each attribute was held fixed. In Figure
1 we present how the revenue ratio varies with the num-
ber of relations. On the other hand we observed that the
ratio remains constant with the number of possible values
of the attributes. The main reason is that the base queries
corresponding to selecting a specific value of some attribute
of a binary relation in general are either all contained in
the fundamental formula minimizer or none. Hence, they
mostly act as a single item and therefore don’t increase the
complexity of the instances. We also observed that due to
the random generation of our instances, as we increased the
number of bidders by much, the ratio actually decreased.
The main reason is that as the number of bidders becomes
large all base queries affect almost homogeneously the rev-
enue and hence a single price scheme is close to optimal.
6.2 Single Minded Valuations
To make the comparison with the exponential optimal al-
gorithm feasible, in this section we focus on single-minded
bidders, which corresponds to the case when the query of
each bidder has a singleton support set, i.e. there is a unique
set of base queries that determine it.
We perform experiments where the bidders have a value
drawn uniformly at random from some set. In addition their
interest set is drawn uniformly at random as follows: we pick
a random number t ∈ [1, |B|] and then we pick t base queries
at random with replacement.
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Figure 2: This plot portrays the average ratio of the
revenue obtained by the multi-price schemes over
the revenue of the single derandomized scheme. The
input instances have 20 buyers and the plot shows
the average ratio as a function of the number of
items/base queries m, varying from 10 to 1000. For
each m, 1000 random instances where ran and the
average ratio is depicted. The green line portrays
the ratio of the LP based multi-price Algorithm and
the blue line the ratio of the combinatorial multi-
price scheme of Section 5.3.
In Figure 2 we compare the revenue performance of the
two algorithms multi-price algorithms with resepct to the
single price one as a function of the number of base queries.
In Figure 3 we compare our LP based multi-price algo-
rithm 2 to the optimal one. We observe that the multi-price
scheme consistently achieves at least 99% of the optimal
revenue.
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We asked the question of how to optimally set the price
to the base queries in the query-based pricing framework
introduced by Koutris et al. [13]. We showed that this
problem is equivalent to an item pricing problem in the envy-
free pricing framework introduced by Guruswami et al. [11].
We gave a strong analogy between the arbitrage freeness
axiom in the query pricing framework with the envy-freeness
concept in the envy-free pricing framework.
We showed that the restricted setting studied by Koutris
et al.[13] that allows for the polynomial computation of the
pricing function, yields a valuation class in the envy-free
pricing framework that has a polynomially computable de-
mand function: given item prices one can compute in poly-
nomial time the optimal set for each player and the total
price that the player will pay for his optimal set.
We used this structural property to improve on existing
pricing schemes from the envy-free literature in two direc-
tions. First we used it to derandomize a random pricing
guarantee so as to achieve more robust revenue approxima-
tions. Secondly, we considered a multi-price extension of
the single-pricing schemes of the literature that always yield
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Figure 3: This plot portrays the average ratio of
the revenue obtained by the LP based multi-price
scheme of Section 5.1 over the optimal revenue ob-
tained by an exponential algorithm. The number of
buyers is constant 7 while the number of items/base
queries varies from 10 to 200.
higher revenue pointwise for each instance of the pricing
problem.
Last we gave some experimental results showing that our
new algorithm can give significant improvement on the rev-
enue achievable by the single pricing schemes and that for
small instances, where the optimal is computable in reason-
able time, the outcome of our multipricing scheme is very
close to optimal.
8. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
An interesting future direction is to apply our results
to a Bayesian setting of incomplete information where the
pair (vi, Qi) of each bidder is independently and identi-
cally distributed according to some distribution D on R+ ×
2Q (Bayesian Setting). In the latter setting the auction-
eer wants to set prices that maximize his expected revenue.
One could use a discretization of the distribution where all
probabilities are multiples of ǫ. Then convert the bayesian
problem into a complete information problem where each
probability mass of ǫ is represented by a different buyer in
the complete information setting, yielding an instance with
1/ǫ buyers. It is reasonable that an approximate solution
in this reduced instance will be an approximate solution to
the initial pricing problem in the Bayesian setting, however
a more rigorous analysis of such an extension is needed.
Another interesting future direction is try to reduce the
computational overhead introduced by having to solve lin-
ear programs in our multi-pricing schemes, while at the same
time yielding very comparable revenue. We gave one such
algorithm, but we believe there is room for improvement in
that direction. It is possible that for this specially struc-
tured LPs that we formulated one could also find an equiv-
alent combinatorial algorithm for finding an optimal or ap-
proximately optimal solution. An initial look towards that
direction shows that LP (11) formulated for single minded
bidders is close to an optimization over a polymatroid in the
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special case when the value of each bidder is uniquely de-
fined by his interest set and is a submodular function of the
interest set: i.e. the value of a player interested in a support
set Ci is vi = v(Ci), where v(·) is a submodular function.
The only difference is that a subset of the constraints of
the polymatroid has been dropped. Despite this fact, under
natural assumptions a greedy approach of sequentially pick-
ing the item that is in the interest set of the most players
and raising it’s price as much as possible, would be a good
approximation to the LP’s value.
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